

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 05356 01 OF 02 071601Z

42

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2546

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3423

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5356

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: FRG POSITION ON PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

BEGIN SUMMARY: FRG DELEGATION HAS PROVIDED MISSION WITH
ADVANCE COPY (FULL TEXT BELOW) OF PAPER ON PRE-REDUCTION
STABILIZING MEASURES, WHICH THEY WILL PRESENT AT NOVEMBER 8
SPC MEETING. PAPER OUTLINES IN SUBSTANTIAL DETAIL GERMAN
POSITION, HIGHLIGHTS OF WHICH ARE THAT:

-IN LIGHT OF NEGATIVE EASTERN ATTITUDE TOWARDS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05356 01 OF 02 071601Z

"ASSOCIATED MEASURES," ALLIES SHOULD MANIFEST
THEIR CONTINUED INTEREST IN SUCH MEASURES, WHICH
COULD NARROW THE SOVIET UNION'S FREEDOM
OF ACTION IN USING WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR

FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES;

-ALLIES SHOULD NOT LIMIT RIGIDLY AREA OF APPLICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES;

-PRE-REDUCTION MEASURE CALLING FOR "PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA INCLUDING ROTATIONS, IS NOT CONTROVERSIAL WITHIN ALLIANCE AND SHOULD BE INTRODUCED INTO DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA;

-MEASURES CALLING FOR "PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA" AND "EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA" SHOULD REMAIN FOR TIME BEING IN THE CSCE CONTEXT AND SHOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED INTO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS;

-ALLIES MIGHT PUT FORWARD PRE-REDUCTION MEASURE ON "LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATIONS, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA," IF COMMITMENT IS WORDED IN GENERAL TERMS, LIMITED IN THE DURATION OF ITS APPLICATION, AND EXTENDED TO HUNGARY;

-FRG AGREES WITH UK ALTERNATIVE MEASURE FOR AN INTERIM MANPOWER STABILIZATION ARRANGEMENT (AS LONG AS IT RELATES ONLY TO MANPOWER LEVELS AND WOULD NOT PREVENT QUALITATIVE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. ACTION REQUESTED: MISSION WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON'S PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO FRG PAPER FORUSE AT NOVEMBER 8 SPC. IF NO INSTRUCTIONS ARE RECEIVED, WE WILL CONFINE OUR COMMENTS TO STATING THAT THE U.S. WILL URGENTLY REVIEW THIS IMPORTANT GERMAN CONTRIBUTION AND WILL HOPE TO HAVE INSTRUCTED REACTIONS NEXT WEEK. END SUMMARY.

FULL TEXT OF FRG PAPER FOLLOWS:

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05356 01 OF 02 071601Z

BEGIN TEXT:

I.

GENERAL REMARKS

1. IN OUR OPINION, MBFR WOULD NOT MEET THE SECURITY-POLICY REQUIREMENTS OF NATO IF IT WOULD ONLY CONSIST IN GEOGRAPHICALLY LIMITED FORCE REDUCTIONS. MBFR SHOULD ALSO CREATE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS WHICH NARROW DOWN THE FREEDOM OF ACTION OF THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING THE USE OF WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR FOREIGN-POLICY PURPOSES. WE ARE AWARE THAT NOW, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MBFR

PROCESS, WE CANNOT YET EXPECT THE WARSAW PACT TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD ALREADY STABILIZE EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN A LASTING MANNER. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, ATTEMPT TO TAKE A FIRST STEP CONTAINING AT LEAST A MINIMUM OF SUBSTANTIVE SECURITY. THE FOLLOWING REASONS SUGGEST THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES INTO THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS:

2. THE OPENING STATEMENTS MADE IN VIENNA ON 30 AND 31 OCTOBER HAVE SHOWN THAT THE EAST HAS NOT CHANGED ITS NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" MENTIONED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973. THE PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES OFFER US AN EARLY POSSIBILITY TO MANIFEST OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN THE DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT OF SUCH MEASURES RELATED TO REDUCTIONS AND TO INTRODUCE THEM INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN CONCRETE TERMS.

3. IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES, WE HAVE, MOREOVER, A POSSIBILITY TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE EXISTING GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITIES WHICH ARE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND FOR FUTURE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

4. THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF MULTILATERAL STABILIZING MEASURES FOR THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN GEOGRAPHICAL AREA POSE A SPECIAL PROBLEM. IN OUR OPINION, MULTILATERAL
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 05356 01 OF 02 071601Z

PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES SHOULD AND CAN BE DEVELOPED WHICH AVOID NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES SUCH AS:

-RESTRICTION OF THE WESTERN FREEDOM OF ACTION WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF THESE MEASURES;

-A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE IN THE FIELDS OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY;

-THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH MEASURES WILL NOT BE APPLIED IN HUNGARY;

-THE CONCLUSION THAT STABILIZING MEASURES WILL BE LIMITED TO THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF REDUCTION MEASURES

5. WITH RESPECT TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF APPLICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES, WE MAINTAIN OUR VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE WESTERN INTEREST NOT TO LIMIT THIS AREA RIGIDLY. THIS APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO THE APPLICATION OF SUCH MEASURES TO HUNGARY, THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN MEASURES TO SOVIET TERRITORY AND THE POSSIBLE PRE-JUDGING OF SECURITY POLICY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN

INTEGRATION. IT SHOULD ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT FUTURE NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY A PREMATURE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES.

II.

COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

6. THE MAIN REASON FOR STABILIZING MEASURES IS THE SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN REDEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIES WHICH RESULTS FROM THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITY. IT IS THEREFORE OBVIOUS THAT SUCH STABILIZING MEASURES SHOULD BE SOUGHT WHICH ARE DIRECTED AT THESE CAPABILITIES.

7. PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES SHOULD PROVIDE A CERTAIN STABILITY FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

SECRET

PAGE 05 NATO 05356 01 OF 02 071601Z

THEY COULD BE REPLACED OR SUPPLEMENTED BY MEASURES WHICH ACCOMPANY THE REDUCTIONS. THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED BEFORE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS ARE IMPLEMENTED. AS PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES SHOULD BE CONGRUENT WITH THE GENERAL OBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THEY SHOULD MEET WITH THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:

-CONCENTRATION ON LAND FORCES;

-CONGRUENCE WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON MANPOWER CEILING IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

-KEEPING OPEN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF FUTURE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS;

-NO NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELDS OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 05356 02 OF 02 071819Z

43

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00

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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2547
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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3424
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 5356

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

III.

COMMENTS ON THE MEASURES SUGGESTED

8. THE PRESENT MEASURE (I) OF PARA 23 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL)
ANTICIPATES THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES
IN A FIRST PHASE. IT CONCURS WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT
STABILIZING MEASURES RELATE ESPECIALLY TO THE REDEPLOYMENT
CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET FORCES. IT UNDERLINES THE
FUTURE REDUCTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN A GEOGRAPHICALLY
LIMITED AREA. THIS MEASURE IS NOT CONTROVERSIAL AND
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05356 02 OF 02 071819Z

SHOULD IN ANY CASE BE INTRODUCED INTO THE
DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA.

9. WITH RESPECT TO THE MEASURES (II) AND (IV), THE
DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA HAVE SHOWN THE DIFFICULTIES
TO OBTAIN ACCEPTANCE OF THE CBMS AT THE CSCE. ON THE
OTHER HAND, A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES HAVE BEEN
PROPOSED IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY SECURITY. MEASURES
(II) AND (IV) SHOULD, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, THEREFORE
REMAIN FOR THE TIME BEING IN THE CSCE CONTEXT AND SHOULD
NOT BE INTRODUCED INTO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS:

- IF THESE TWO MEASURES WERE INTRODUCED INTO THE MBFR
CONTEXT, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT DECIDE TO ACCEPT THIS
DISCUSSION IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO AVOID A DISCUSSION
AT THE CSCE. IN THIS WAY, IT MIGHT ATTEMPT TO DISPOSE
OF THE ASPECT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
OF APPLICATION OF THE CBMS;

- IF SUBSEQUENTLY THE TWO MEASURES WERE NO LONGER DISCUSSED IN THE CSCE CONTEXT, THE OTHER PROPOSALS IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY SECURITY WOULD BECOME MORE PROMINENT. THE INTEREST IN A CONCRETE DISCUSSION OF MILITARY MEASURES AT THE CSCE COULD THEN NO LONGER BE CONCENTRATED ON THE SUBJECTS PROPOSED BY US. IF A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION IS FOUND FOR THESE CBMS AT THE CSCE, THE TWO MEASURES COULD STILL BE INTRODUCED INTO THE MBFR-CONTEXT AT A LATER DATE.

10. MEASURE (III)(LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATIONS, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA) AIMS AT AGREEMENTS WHICH QUALITATIVELY DIFFER FROM THE COMMITMENT CONTAINED IN MEASURE (I). OBJECTIONS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF MEASURE (III) IN AN EARLY PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE MITIGATED IF THE CORRESPONDING COMMITMENT IS WORDED IN GENERAL TERMS, IS RELATED TO THE SIZE, DURATION AND FREQUENCY WHICH HAVE BEEN CUSTOMARY UP TO NOW AND IF IT IS LIMITED CONCERNING THE DURATION OF ITS APPLICATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE FOLLOWING WORDING MIGHT BE CONCEIVABLE:

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05356 02 OF 02 071819Z

"THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDERTAKE NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMBER AND SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OF THEIR LAND FORCES WHILE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS."

11. WE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE REACTIONS OF OUR ALLIES TO THIS POINT. WE FEEL THAT SUCH A COMMITMENT SHOULD ALSO BE EXTENDED TO HUNGARY.

IV.

COMMENTS ON THE BRITISH PAPER

12. IN ADDITION TO THE MEASURES (II) TO (IV), MEASURES ARE CONCEIVABLE WHICH HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT, ARE EASY TO INTEGRATE INTO THE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT AND DO NOT PRE-JUDGE LATER STABILIZING MEASURES. THE BRITISH PAPER PROVIDES A SUITABLE BASIS FOR A DISCUSSION OF SUCH MEASURES:

13. WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE MEASURE SUGGESTED IN PARA 12 OF THE BRITISH PAPER WOULD MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF A PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURE. WE SUGGEST THAT PRIORITY SHOULD NOW BE GIVEN TO THE DISCUSSION OF THIS THOUGHT. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KNOW WHICH FORM OF AGREEMENT OF SUCH A MEASURE COULD BE ENVISAGED.

14. WE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT AN ARRANGEMENT WITH THE

OTHER SIDE ON THE PRESERVATION OF THE EXISTING FORCE LEVEL
DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING
POINTS:

- IT SHOULD ONLY RELATE TO MANPOWER LEVELS (I.E. ONLY
TO THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS IN THE GROUND FORCES;
- SUCH A COMMITMENT SHOULD NOT RELATE TO THE MANPOWER
LEVELS OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES CONCERNED, BUT
SHOULD HAVE AS ITS POINT OF REFERENCE THE OVERALL
NUMERICAL LEVEL OF THE GROUND FORCES MANPOWER OF ALL
THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 05356 02 OF 02 071819Z

- AN ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE SO WORDED THAT IT DOES NOT
PREFERT QUALITATIVE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS;
 - AN ARRANGEMENT OF THIS KIND MUST BE LIMITED TO THE
DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS;
 - IF POSSIBLE, HUNGARY SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED IN SUCH AN
ARRANGEMENT. AT ANY RATE, THIS POINT WOULD HAVE TO BE
EXAMINED SEPARATELY FOR SOVIET FORCES.
15. WE COULD IMAGINE THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE
PUBLISHED BY A COMMUNIQUE OF THE VIENNA PLENARY MEETING IN
WHICH NOTE IS TAKEN OF THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED
(OR BOTH SIDES) INTEND
- TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONDUCT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS;
 - TO REFRAIN FROM RAISING THE OVERALL NUMERICAL LEVEL OF
GROUND FORCES PERSONNEL PERMANENTLY PRESENT IN THE AREA
(INCLUDING HUNGARY);
 - TO RESPECT THIS UNDERTAKING WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR
ARE IN PROGRESS.

16. A PROPOSAL OF THIS NATURE WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING
A) ADVANTAGES:

- NO QUALITATIVE CONDITIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE
AREA OF APPLICATION OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS;
- IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE WARSAW PACT TO JUSTIFY
A REJECTION OF THIS PROPOSAL;
- THE IDEA OF "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" WOULD BE INTRODUCED IN
PRINCIPLE INTO THE DISCUSSION;
- THE SOVIET UNION WOULD EXPLICITLY DECLARE ITSELF

WILLING TO DISCONTINUE THE CONSTANT NUMERICAL
STRENGTHENING OF ITS FORCES;

B) DISADVANTAGES:

SECRET

PAGE 05 NATO 05356 02 OF 02 071819Z

- A POSSIBLE LIMITATION OF OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION
IN CASE OF A UNILATERAL INCREASE IN WARSAW PACT
FORCES MANPOWER WHICH COULD NOT BE PUBLICLY PROVED;

- THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROPAGANDISTICAL EXPLOITATION OF
NORMAL FLUCTUATIONS IN FORCES MANPOWER LEVELS BELOW
THE OVERALL NUMERICAL LEVEL.

END TEXT. MCAULIFFE

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